"Metaphysics" in Economics

This is a review of the concept of Joan Robinon's "metaphysics" in economics...I suppose we might call it "economic metaphysics" or something like that. The interested reader may peruse her original book on the subject:

Joan Robinson, Economic Philosophy. Penguin books, 1962. Freely available online at archive.org.

My page numbers will refer to the Penguin edition.

Definition of Metaphysics

Robinson begins with the definition of metaphysics, saying:

The hallmark of a metaphysical proposition is that it is incapable of being tested. We cannot say in what respect the world would be different if it were not true. The world would be just the same except that we would be making different noises about it. It can never be proved wrong, for it will roll out of every argument on its own circularity; it claims to be true by definition of its own terms. It purports to say something about real life, but we can learn nothing from it. Adopting Professor Popper's [fn: See The Logic of Scientific Discovery] criterion for propositions that belong to the empirical sciences, that they are incapable of being falsified by evidence, it is not a scientific proposition. (pp. 8.75--9.1)

Question 1. Is this a good definition of a "metaphysical proposition"?

But look, we really have two different criteria for a metaphysical proposition given:

Popperian Critera: "...it is incapable of being tested. [...] they are incapable of being falsified by evidence [...]."

Logical-Positivist Criteria: "It can never be proved wrong, for it will roll out of every argument on its own circularity; it claims to be true by definition of its own terms. It purports to say something about real life, but we can learn nothing from it."

Well, okay, so we have two different criterion...is this really a bad thing? It is if they are inconsistent, i.e., we have a proposition be metaphysical in one criterion but not in the other.

We have to dissect the Popperian critera a bit further before answering our first question.

Question 2. Is "Testability" Well-Defined?

Robinson continues, asking about the Classical Economist's notion of 'value' "What is it? where shall we find it? Like all metaphysical concepts, when you try to pin it down it turns out to be just a word" (p. 29.66).

The objection raised is we cannot observe value, therefore it cannot be falsifiable or testable. (This is the subject of the second chapter.)

This seems too naive stating "observable = testable = scientific". After all, hard sciences don't use this criteria (otherwise renormalization in QFT would be "metaphysical", as well as natural selection in biology, among many other scientific concepts).

Do we "observe" the business cycle or its symptoms? Well, it's the latter (with unemployment, inflation, and other indicators reflecting the state of the cycle).

So the business cycle is not testable, according to this strict criteria. It's "metaphysics".

After all, we observe only "symptoms"...does that mean we should designate the disease as "metaphysics"?

I don't think so...

Back to Question 1: Consistency of Criteria?

Well, the business cycle isn't "observable" although its symptoms are observed. The Popperian criterion qualifies it as a "metaphysical concept".

Now, to answer our question "Are the two criteria for metaphysics consistent?" We will examine...whether the business cycle qualifies in the "Logical Positivist" sense as "metaphysics".

Really, we have two different notions here: (a) the model explaining the business cycle, and (b) the phenomenon of the business cycle [i.e., the actual process itself].

The logical positivist criteria would consider (a).

I will state here my confessed belief that the model for the business cycle is not "circular" (no more so than any other model). If pushed, I don't know if I could defend this position in a short time --- we would have to specify which model!

But we have inconsistent results from the two criteria: Popper says the business cycle is metaphysics, whereas the Logical Positivist approach disagrees.

Answer to question 1: the criteria given is inconsistent.

Addendum: On Language Games

This dawned on me after posting: Wittgenstein's "language games" and "rule-following" are important and relevant concepts when discussing "metaphysics".

Question 3. Can we classify a proposition as neither "scientific" nor "metaphysical"?

After all, the Popperian criterion boils down to "analytic proposition = metaphysical, and synthetic proposition = scientific".

This tacitly assumes that language reflects reality. (Yep, time to drop the W-bomb!)

Wittgenstein's "language-games" demolishes this assumption (for reviews, see Xanthos' Wittgenstein's Language Games and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry).

After all, doesn't this alleviate our anxieties Popper raised concerning the distinction between model and symptoms?

I should probably flesh this out a bit more, but I'm certain anyone could write a thesis on "Robinson's 'metaphysics' in the context of Wittgenstein's 'language games'"...

Addendum 2: Metaphysics is Metaphysical

Question 4. Is the concept of a "metaphysical proposition" itself a metaphysical proposition?

I am a bit sloppy here. I should specify: isn't the proposition "A metaphysical proposition exists" a metaphysical proposition?

What do I mean by "metaphysical proposition"? It doesn't matter. Lets consider both criterion for a "metaphysical proposition".

Using Popperian Criterion. We can't observe a "metaphysical proposition", since it's entirely a human construct. So, I guess that means it is metaphysical.

I fear I am using a caricature of the Popperian criterion, so critical comments would be welcome!

Using Logical-Positivist Criterion. "It can never be proved wrong, for it will roll out of every argument on its own circularity; it claims to be true by definition of its own terms. It purports to say something about real life, but we can learn nothing from it."

Isn't this vacuous?

After all, regarding the proposition "A metaphysical proposition exists" — well, we "cannot say in what respect the world would be different if it were not true."

Hence, we conclude the existence of metaphysical propositions...is a metaphysical notion.

Question 5. Does "metaphysics" contribute to economics? More precisely, does is this a useful dichotomy [a proposition is "scientific" or "metaphysical"] or not?

I wonder about this, because what are we left with when we examine only "scientific propositions" in economics?

We're left with what may be observed. Isn't this merely econometrics?

Whenever discussing econometrics, someone ivariably invokes the Lucas Critique.

Tangential Question: Is the Lucas Critique a metaphysical proposition? [We'll have to consider this another time...]

Categorizing a proposition as either "scientific" or "metaphysics" implicitly gives it a positive or negative connotation (respectively).

Denoting propositions as "metaphysics" boils down to using loaded terms.

What's worse, Robinson notes "Yet metaphysical statements are not without content" and "Metaphysical propositions also provide a quarry from which hypotheses can be drawn" (9.1--9.5).

The only positive twist I could put is if Robinson meant "metaphysical propositions" belong to an Althusserian problematic...a background "idea-logical" [ideological] framework an economist brings to the game.

Is that even useful to know?

Question 6. If we weaken "testability", can we get a good notion of "metaphysics"?

I think we're being too strict with our notion of "metaphysics". We should use a slightly different criterion, a little weaker than either given.

It seems "testability" is too strict for economics. We should be a little weaker...if the concept produces "accurate predictions", we should consider it scientific.

Joan Robinson says the notion of "Value" [in Classical Economics] is metaphysical since we cannot "observe" it...we don't find it living under a rock.

BUT we can predict prices using "values". If the predicted prices are "wrong", then the concept of "value" would be incorrect.

Although this is a more realistic criterion for "testability", it would violate the understanding that metaphysical propositions constitute the ideological framework an economist uses to analyze phenomena.